NSS & Pakistan
March 4, 2010 Leave a comment
Dr. Shireen M Mazari
President Obama has called a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April (12-13) this year and more than 40 heads of state are expected to attend. This is a follow-on from Obama’s Prague speech of April 5 in which he outlined his arms control and nuclear nonproliferation objectives with nuclear terrorism topping the list. Now there is a growing lobby within Washington that sees Obama’s nuclear arms reduction and disarmament pledges as threatening to US long-term interests; and so far Obama has not managed to move substanti-vely on his commitments in this field – as has been the story with him since he began functioning as the US president. In fact, so far his foreign policy in actual actions has not strayed too far from that of his predecessor.
Be that as it may, since the Pakistani president will also be present at this Summit, the country needs to evolve a policy on nuclear security that ensures Pakistan’s interests for the future. One does not expect President Zardari to actually take a strong nationalist position against the Western tide at the Summit, but we can at least highlight what does need to be done and live in hope. A beginning needs to be made by preparing our interpretations of the four main points of the Obama nonproliferation objectives. The environment envisaged is not a UN-type international framework for nuclear security but a US-led framework, with the US firmly in the driving seat. So, the first thing Pakistan needs to build support for the view that any such framework must be within a UN framework and support for this view can be built amongst the developing states, who are critical to the success of this Summit.
Then comes the Obama agenda, beginning with the desire to “lead a global effort” to secure all vulnerable nuclear weapons materials at vulnerable sites within a time frame of four years – Obama’s term in office! Now clearly, Pakistan will be targeted on this count but we need to point to the truly vulnerable sites which actually are primarily in the US. After all, it is from the US that a USAF plane simply took off with live nuclear weapons and no one knew who had authorised it or where it was headed. So there are serious question marks about US command and control and till these are cleared, US nuclear sites need to be under extra international supervision. Also, Pakistan needs to demand at this Summit that all past incidences of “loose nukes” be evaluated and the most vulnerable or accident-prone sites should then be secured. Of course no such incidents have ever cropped up in Pakistan so we should ensure that our nuclear sites do not even come up for discussion – although that will be part of the US agenda.
Then Obama is seeking, according to his Prague speech, new partnerships and new standards to protect sensitive nuclear materials. Well, if Obama is really committed to this objective, the first thing he needs to do is to move out of the nuclear deal with India – the 123 Agreement – since that widens the scope for diversion of nuclear materials for weapons purposes, given the lose safeguards agreements and the freeing of Indian fissile material for the production of more nukes. So far the US has set regressive standards for nuclear material safety through this deal with India and through its continuing proliferation to Israel – so let the US move towards setting new standards that truly ensure nonproliferation. Many states will be prepared to enter into nondiscriminatory partnerships with the US on this count.
Obama also wants to convert coalitions of the willing effectively into international institutions – such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Effort to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. PSI should certainly be open to all states but for Pakistan it is essential to ensure that this does not contravene the Law of the Sea agreements. As for the Global Effort to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, there are already international treaties that exist like the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Treaty. Why not simply stren-gthen these? Also, the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference is coming up in May and it is time the NPT was brought in line with the prevailing ground realities where two overt nuclear weapon states are not accommodated as such within the Treaty.
As for the desire to build efforts to break up nuclear black markets and use financial tools to disrupt this trade, this too requires a cooperative international framework where no one state or its people are targeted as Pakistan has been. After all, the so-called “Khan network” comprised primarily Europeans and Southeast Asia-ns but only Pakistan and Dr Khan were targeted. Unless politics is left out of this issue, there can be no real movement to create a substantive framework for actually stopping the trade in clandestine nuclear material transfers.
Beyond this, Pakistan needs to suggest some proactive proposals which can ensure greater nuclear security. The first proposal should centre on the international availability of technologies that can enhance the security of nuclear weapons and sites, without conditi-onalities. Also, it is no use trying to deal solely with the threat of nuclear terrorism – which is not in reality the major weapon of terrorism – without going into understanding root causes of terrorism and the fallout of military-centric approaches.
Linked to this issue is the reality of the US and Indian doctrinal trends towards first use of nuclear weapons as reflected in the US Nuclear Posture Review as well its decision to produce mini battlefield nukes and India’s nuclear doctrine. Unless countries like these really commit to altering their aggressive nuclear doctrines, they will increase the assumption globally that nuclear weapons are viable militarily – something deterrence had done away with before it was cast aside by Bush Jr and has not been restored in US strategic thinking since.
Pakistan also needs to demand a review of the US position on the FMCT, especially on international verifications and most importantly on reduction in existing stockpiles. If there is to be nuclear security globally, the massive existing stockpiles need to be reduced first before a Fissile Material Treaty can come into being – as opposed to a discriminatory Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty. There are many other ideas Pakistan can evolve and push for at the Summit to give the world an idea of how we, a nuclear power, are thinking on nuclear security issues.
Pakistan needs to be clear on all these points and on its own red lines so no ad hoc compromises are affected in Washington. Already the Americans are putting the pressure through their so-called non-official channels. We are soon going to be visited by two US think tank people extremely hostile to Pakistan and its nuclear programme: Michael Kreppon and George Perkovich. Our Establishment is awaiting them eagerly simply because they have led the criticism on the Indo-US nuclear deal. What has been forgotten is their constant targeting of Pakistan’s nuclear programme – such is our passion and desire to embrace all things Americans. Let us hope we rid ourselves of this dangerous naiveté before the Washington Summit!